Cet essai développe une approche «trichotomique» du désir transcendantal de l'être humain pour la croissance et le développement. Le but principal de l'article est de s'enquérir du monde «après la vertu», pour citer les paroles de Alasdair MacIntyre. On le fait en montrant qu'après la réalisation légitime du bien-être psycho-physique, la recherche de la justice humaine poussera l'humanité jusqu'au point où cette recherche se supprime elle-même. Les biens, en effet, auxquels nous ne pouvons qu'aspirer - comme une connaissance définitive, une (...) jouissance inconditionnée d'une identité authentique, une justice pleinement satisfaisante - sont en soi et pour soi au-delà de notre capacité. De cette façon, la recherche produit un résultat strictement mystico-théologique: nous sommes incapables de nous assurer du Dieu que nous cherchons naturellement. Dans l'angoisse qui s'ensuit, il ne reste qu'une option, et elle est radicale: l'abandon aimant de soi-même en Dieu ou l'entretien moral de soi-même. Nous nous trouvons donc devant la porte qui ouvre sur le chemin de la forme la plus radicale du péché, qui n'est pas seulement morale, mais proprement théologique: il devient impossible de vivre avec le Dieu vivant, et l'humanité s'installera dans l'idolâtrie et l'athéisme comme options religieuses. Mais laissée à soi-même, la religiosité humaine deviendra une recherche troublante, capable de rendre acceptable des actes immoraux inouïs: 'Tantum religio p. (shrink)

Charles Taylor in A Secular Age (2007) reopened the debate about the possibility of “reenchantment,” presupposing that “enchantment” once existed, but got lost, such that we arrived at a state of “disenchantment.” However, the no longer marginal debate on the possibility of a “re-enchantment,” is in my view chaotic and lacks precise definitions. In this article the author tries to clarify the concepts involved and put some order in the debate and investigate the possibilities for a kind of re-enchantment. Firstly, (...) she discloses enchantment, disenchantment, and reenchantment as factors in an intellectual scheme, rather than as concepts describing an historical reality. Secondly, she shows that these terms are not applicable to epoque defining sociocultural constellations, a common conviction, defended by Taylor too, which has awkward ideology-related implications. Finally, she points out, in an analysis inspired by Ricoeur, that it rather is the domain of the individual life where the loss and the recovering of enchantment may take place, in a dynamic between the individual and the “call of reality,” having the enchanting capacity to inspire possible lives and give our lives its beacons. (shrink)

In this book two of the leading figures in argumentation theory present a view of argumentation as a means of resolving differences of opinion by testing the acceptability of the disputed positions. Their model of a 'critical discussion' serves as a theoretical tool for analysing, evaluating and producing argumentative discourse. They develop a method for the reconstruction of argumentative discourse that takes into account all aspects that are relevant to a critical assessment. They also propose a practical code of behaviour (...) for discussants who want to resolve their differences in a reasonable way. This is a major contribution to the study of argumentation and will be of particular value to professionals and graduate students in speech communication, informal logic, rhetoric, critical thinking, linguistics, and philosophy. (shrink)

Mathematicians suggest that some proofs are valued for their explanatory value. This has led to a philosophical debate about the distinction between explanatory and non-explanatory proofs. In this paper, we explore whether contrasting views about the explanatory value of proof are possible and how to understand these diverging assessments. By considering an epistemic and contextual conception of explanation, we can make sense of disagreements about explanatoriness in mathematics by identifying differences in the background knowledge, skill corpus, or epistemic aims of (...) mathematicians or mathematical communities. We focus on the relation between explanation, epistemic aims and diverging explanatory assessments by looking at cases from mathematical practice. (shrink)

In this volume the history of Islamic sects is analysed as a literary genus in its own right. It consists of three sections: the first deals with structural constants in the texts such as the arrangement, or the number and classification of the "sects." The main section describes the most important works and authors from the 8th to the 19th century. Finally, the central concepts - "religion," "sects," "orthodoxy," etc. - are considered and the historical background of the literary development (...) examined in more detail. It turns out that the "heresies" were rather "confessions" which can be understood as proof of the pluralistic structure of the Islamic community. (shrink)

This introductory chapter sets the stage for an engaging exploration of the multifaceted concept of proof in the philosophy of mathematical practice. As a fundamental pillar of mathematics, proof has long been a subject of intense scrutiny for mathematicians and philosophers alike. Traditionally, proofs have been perceived as rigorous and deductive arguments, and this analysis was directed towards the notion of formal proof. However, recent developments have challenged this traditional view, highlighting the dynamic and evolving nature of mathematical proofs. In (...) this section, we bring together diverse perspectives from leading scholars to delve into the philosophical significance and complexity of mathematical proof. (shrink)

Die Studien zur Geschichte und Kultur des islamischen Orients / Studies in the History and Culture of the Islamic Orient ist die Reihe der "Beihefte" zur Zeitschrift Der Islam. Beide werden von der Abteilung für Geschichte und Kultur des Vorderen Orients, Asien-Afrika-Institut, Universität Hamburg herausgegeben. Die Abteilung wurde im Jahre 1908 noch vor der Universität Hamburg gegründet. Sie war unter ihrem ersten Direktor C. H. Becker das erste wissenschaftliche Zentrum in Deutschland, in dem die Lehre und Forschung sich auf die (...) historischen und kulturwissenschaftlichen und nicht allein die philologischen Aspekte bei der Erforschung der islamischen Welt konzentrierte. Viele führende Experten der deutschen Islamwissenschaft haben hier gelehrt und/oder studiert. Mit dem gleichen hohen Anspruch und der gleichen hohen Qualität wie Der Islamhaben die "Beihefte" zahlreiche Arbeiten über die Geschichte und Kultur der islamischen Welt publiziert, die jeweils Meilensteine in ihrem Feld darstellten. Die seit 2004 erscheinende "Neue Folge" der Beihefte baut auf dieser Tradition auf und bietet eine Plattform für die Publikation von Studien über die Geschichte und Kultur der islamischen Welt vom Beginn des Islams bis in die heutige Zeit. (shrink)

Pragmatics and dialectics are two disciplines which have been amongst the first and most important partners for argument studies in the exploration of the complex realm of communication. Treating argumentation as a construct consisting of premises and conclusion allows for investigating some interesting properties of the phenomenon of reasoning, but does not capture a variety of aspects related to the usage of natural language and dialogical context in which real-life argumentation is typically embedded. This special issue explores some of the (...) fascinating research questions which emerge when we move beyond logic into the territory of the pragmatics and dialectics of argument. (shrink)

Enchanting Nietzsche: On ‘god is dead’ and new life For a long time, Nietzsche was considered by his contemporaries primarily as a literary man. In philosophy and theology, the death of God nevertheless found resonance in the secularization debate. In this article I take a different path and will introduce a similar autopsy in the dis-re-enchantment debate. To this end, I revert mainly to the literary metaphors in Nietzsche’s work, of course without ignoring its philosophical (and theological) value. First, I (...) retranslate some echoes of Nietzsche’s word from the secularization debate into the disenchantment debate. Here I note that this retranslation requires a shift from cultural to personal history. This provides me with two new, unexpected echoes of Nietzsche’s word. It also places radical questions on the current disenchantment debate. (shrink)

The ‘What Being the Parent of a New Baby is Like-Revised’ is an instrument designed to measure adaptation to parenthood. In the process of pilot testing and validating the WPL-R in a postpartum Dutch population, we became aware of the potentially sensitive nature of the measure. Despite the ethics committee waiving the invasive nature of the measure, we conducted a survey to explore its possible effect on women’s thoughts and emotions by using the Positive And Negative Affect Schedule to measure (...) changes associated with completion of the WPL-R. Two hundred and fifteen questionnaires were returned. Our findings indicated a change in PANAS scores, implying an intervening effect when using the WPL-R, in research. This raises the question of whether it is acceptable to use a questionnaire with postpartum women without any knowledge of the possible effect it may have, even though the ethics committee has approved the study and considers the measure to be non-invasive. (shrink)

PurposeIn this article, we aim to present and defend a contextual approach to mathematical explanation.MethodTo do this, we introduce an epistemic reading of mathematical explanation.ResultsThe epistemic reading not only clarifies the link between mathematical explanation and mathematical understanding, but also allows us to explicate some contextual factors governing explanation. We then show how several accounts of mathematical explanation can be read in this approach.ConclusionThe contextual approach defended here clears up the notion of explanation and pushes us towards a pluralist vision (...) on mathematical explanation. (shrink)

Flow is a gratifying state of deep involvement and absorption that individuals report when facing a challenging activity and they perceive adequate abilities to cope with it. The flow concept was introduced by Csikszentmihalyi in 1975, and interest in flow research is growing. However, to our best knowledge, no scoping review exists that takes a systematic look at studies on flow which were published between the years 2000 and 2016. Overall, 252 studies have been included in this review. Our review (...) provides a framework to cluster flow research, gives a systematic overview about existing studies and their findings, and provides an overview about implications for future research. The provided framework consists of three levels of flow research. In the first “Individual” level are the categories for personality, motivation, physiology, emotion, cognition, and behavior. The second “Contextual” level contains the categories for contextual and interindividual factors and the third “Cultural” level contains cultural factors that relate to flow. Using our framework, we systematically present the findings for each category. While flow research has made progress in understanding flow, in the future, more experimental and longitudinal studies are needed to gain deeper insights into the causal structure of flow and its antecedents and consequences. (shrink)

In ‘The making of argumentation theory’ van Eemeren and van Haaften describe the contributions made to the five components of a full-fledged research program of argumentation theory by four prominent approaches to the discipline: formal dialectics, rhetoric/pragmalinguistics, informal logic, and pragma-dialectics. Most of these approaches do not contribute to all components, but to some in particular. Starting from the pragma-dialectical view of the relationship between dialectical reasonableness and rhetorical effectiveness – the crucial issue in argumentation theory – van Eemeren and (...) van Haaften explain the positions taken by representatives from the approaches discussed and indicate where they differ from the pragma-dialectical approach. It transpires that approaches focusing on dialectical reasonableness are, next to pragma-dialectics, formal dialectics and informal logic; approaches focusing on rhetorical effectiveness are, next to pragma-dialectics, rhetoric and pragmalinguistics, and the informal logician Tindale. When it comes to the relationship between dialectical reasonableness and rhetorical effectiveness, some interest in it is shown in rhetoric and pragmalinguistics, but only in pragma-dialectics and in Tindale’s work is it a real focus. The main difference between Tindale’s view and the pragma-dialectical view is that in pragma-dialectics the decisive role in deciding about reasonableness is assigned to a code of conduct for reasonable argumentative discourse and in Tindale’s approach this role is assigned to Tindale’s interpretation of the Perelmanian universal audience. (shrink)

Is guidance by social norms compatible with rationality? Jon Elster has argued inThe Cement of Societythat there is a fundamental contrast between rationality and conformity to social norms. The context of study is the problem of collective action, with special emphasis on collective wage bargaining. In such negotiations, the appeal to social norms rather than to self-interest can block agreement. Suppose one union is committed to the norm of equal pay for equal work; another one appeals to the norm of (...) equal pay for everybody, regardless of the type of work. ‘In the presence of competing norms that favor different groups, the self-righteousness conferred by belief in a norm can lead to a bargaining impasse.'In confrontations between individuals, codes of honor can produce similar problems. It is in no one's interest to face a colleague over the barrel of a gun because one has made a nasty remark about his latest book, but if the code demands that one fight it out, the challenge must be accepted. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Kinship:The Relationship Between Johnstone's Ideas about Philosophical Argument and the Pragma-Dialectical Theory of ArgumentationFrans H. van Eemeren and Peter Houtlosser1. Johnstone on the Nature of Philosophical ArgumentAs he himself declared in Validity and Rhetoric in Philosophical Argument (1978, 1), the late philosopher Henry W. Johnstone Jr. devoted a long period of his professional life to clarifying the nature of philosophical argument. His well-known view was that philosophical arguments are (...) sui generis, i.e., not to be judged by the standards of argumentation in science or everyday discourse. Philosophical arguments are not ad rem, but are based on premises that are expressed or implied commitments of a party in dialogue. This is why philosophical argumentation is, according to Johnstone, always ad hominem. In philosophical argumentation, every ad rem argument begs the question.Usually, ad hominem argumentation is dismissed as invalid. Johnstone, however, maintains that making use of argumentum ad hominem is the only way to establish a philosophical conclusion. In an argumentum ad hominem, inferences are drawn from propositions stated or implied by the other party and critical questions are raised about the conclusions that were drawn, so that it can be used to refute a philosophical position by showing that this position is inconsistent. As Walton (2001) rightly observes, this type of ad hominem argumentation boils down to arguing from commitments of the other party, i.e., ex concessis.The use of ad hominem argumentation as the criticism of a position in terms of its own presuppositions is, in Johnstone's view, the only valid argument in philosophy, if any philosophical argument is indeed valid. All philosophical polemic is in this perspective in fact addressed ad hominem. This applies not only to philosophical argumentation that concerns self-referential refutation but also to other ad hominem types of philosophical argumentation, including the tu quoque argument (1978, 11–12).According to Johnstone, there is no objective criterion for determining the validity of ad hominem argumentation. Validity must, says Johnstone in the [End Page 51] epilogue of his collected essays on philosophical argument, be viewed as "a regulative ideal" (135). Much earlier, Johnstone had already come to the conclusion that "the valid argument is the one that maintains philosophical discussion" (38). It is this self-perpetuating feature that is the distinctive rationality of philosophy. By forcing the interlocutor to elaborate his philosophical position rather than just repeat it, the gap between the interlocutors is bridged.In order to distinguish between constructive persuasive argumentation and mere repetition or other forms of paralyzing the discourse, the line must be drawn between responsible and irresponsible persuasion. This is a problem for Johnstone. Where the Ancients solved the problem by insisting that the persuader be virtuous, Johnstone proposed to base the distinction between responsible and irresponsible persuasion on the attitude of the philosopher and his interest in maintaining the philosophical enterprise. The philosopher is a critic who criticizes con amore. His intention to do so, however, is revealed "only in the way he goes about his work" (84).A more down to earth criterion for responsible persuasion that Johnstone proposed is that the discourse should not tend to degenerate. Logic, as the discipline concerned with reason, serves to prevent the discussion from degenerating, but it can do so only if the parties concerned have jointly committed themselves to certain logical principles. If in philosophical argument a defendant is under no obligation to acknowledge an inconsistency when the other party points out an inconsistency in his position, then the other party's criticism cannot count as valid. According to Johnstone, however, it will depend on the parties' presuppositions whether or not they consider two statements as being inconsistent. In other words, what is inconsistent for the one party may not be inconsistent for the other party.Few obligations are imposed on everyone; most obligations arise from commitments made by specific individuals or groups of individuals. As Johnstone says, "Even the cogent philosophical argument is not, of course, absolutely cogent; it is cogent only relatively to interlocutors who maintain the premises on which it depends" (27). Once we abandon the search for objective conditions under which philosophical arguments can be valid, according... (shrink)

In this article, we sketch a new approach to law and ethics. The traditional paradigm, exemplified in the debate on liberal moralism, becomes increasingly inadequate. Its basic assumptions are that there are clear moral norms of positive or critical morality, and that making statutory norms is an effective method to have citizens conform to those norms. However, for many ethical issues that are on the legislative agenda, e.g. with respect to bioethics and anti-discrimination law, the moral norms are controversial, vague (...) or still evolving. Moreover, law proves not to be a very effective instrument. Therefore, we need a new paradigm, both for descriptive and for normative analysis. This interactive paradigm, as a normative position, can be summarised in two theses. The process of legislation on ethical issues should be structured as a process of interaction between the legislature and society or relevant sectors of society, so that the development of new moral norms and the development of new legal norms may reinforce each other. And legislation on ethical issues should be designed in such a way that it is an effective form of communication which, moreover, facilitates an ongoing moral debate and an ongoing reflection on such issues, because this is the best method to ensure that the practice remains oriented to the ideals and values the law tries to realise. (shrink)

The book offers a compact but comprehensive introductory overview of the crucial components of argumentation theory. In presenting this overview, argumentation is consistently approached from a pragma-dialectical perspective by viewing it pragmatically as a goal-directed communicative activity and dialectically as part of a regulated critical exchange aimed at resolving a difference of opinion. As a result, the book also systematically explains how the constitutive parts of the pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation, which are discussed in a number of separate publications, hang (...) together. The following crucial topics are discussed: argumentation theory as a discipline; the meta-theoretical principles of pragma-dialectics; the model of a critical discussion aimed at resolving a difference of opinion; fallacies as violations of a code of conduct for reasonable argumentative discourse; descriptive research of argumentative reality; analysis as theoretically-motivated reconstruction; strategic manoeuvring aimed at combining achieving effectiveness with maintaining reasonableness; the conventionalization of argumentative practices; prototypical argumentative patterns; pragma-dialectics amidst other approaches. Argumentation Theory: A Pragma-Dialectical Perspective is clearly written and makes argumentation theory understandable to all scholars and advanced students interested in argumentation research. (shrink)

Over the last few decades there have been several calls for a “big picture” of the history of science. There is a general need for a concise overview of the rise of modern science, with a clear structure allowing for a rough division into periods. This essay proposes such a scheme, one that is both elementary and comprehensive. It focuses on four machines, which can be seen to have mediated between science and society during successive periods of time: the clock, (...) the balance, the steam engine, and the computer. Following an extended developmental phase, each of these machines came to play a highly visible role in Western societies, both socially and economically. Each of these machines, moreover, was used as a powerful resource for the understanding of both inorganic and organic nature. More specifically, their metaphorical use helped to construe and refine some key concepts that would play a prominent role in such understanding. In each case the key concept would at some point be considered to represent the ultimate building block of reality. Finally, in a refined form, each of these machines would eventually make its entry in scientific research, thereby strengthening the ties between these machines and nature. (shrink)

How do Dutch people let each other know that they disagree? What do they say when they want to resolve their difference of opinion by way of an argumentative discussion? In what way do they convey that they are convinced by each other’s argumentation? How do they criticize each other’s argumentative moves? Which words and expressions do they use in these endeavors? By answering these questions this short essay provides a brief inventory of the language of argumentation in Dutch.